Photo: Grayling Spring fishery lies just below where Haggart Creek joins the main river, in an area where cyanide levels exceed safe limits for fish and wildlife / Courtesy of Dawna Hope.
By Sonal Gupta
Local Journalism Initiative Reporter
Canada’s National Observer
A year after the catastrophic collapse at Yukon’s Eagle Gold Mine, a government-commissioned investigation confirms a series of technical failures — including unstable slopes, faulty drainage and construction mistakes which sent nearly two million tonnes of cyanide-laced ore into the valley and local waterways.
For the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun First Nation, whose traditional territory surrounds the mine, the disaster only confirmed what they already knew.
Chief Dawna Hope said the community raised concerns about the mine’s safety for years, but their warnings were not heeded.
“Our lands and our way of life are constantly under tremendous threat, and our treaty partner is failing to take steps to protect our traditional territory,” Hope said.
The collapse upended daily life in surrounding communities, including Mayo — a remote town about 400 kilometres north of Whitehorse that sits along the Stewart River and is home to many members of the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun First Nation.
The spring grayling fishery, once a seasonal tradition for local families, is now a source of concern, with residents avoiding the area out of fear that the fish may contain elevated levels of cyanide and heavy metals.
“Now we can’t trust the land any longer,” Hope said. “Our citizens are still grieving and trying to understand.”
The First Nation’s 1993 modern treaty with Yukon and Canada was supposed to guarantee a meaningful say in land use, but Hope said those promises have not been kept.
Since the week of the disaster, the First Nation has called for a full public inquiry — a process that could look at who was responsible and how to prevent future failures, Hope said. After BC’s Mount Polley disaster, an immediate public inquiry was launched — something Yukon still hasn’t done.
“It’s frustrating, of course, because things — I feel — could have been in play already and we could have been halfway to the answer potentially,” she said.
The Independent Review Board (IRB), a panel of technical experts appointed by the Yukon government, was tasked with investigating the causes of the June 2024 heap leach failure. The 156-page report concluded that the disaster resulted from “the accumulation of a series of adverse conditions and events.”
In addition to these geotechnical issues, the report found that “actions and inactions” of the mine’s owner, Victoria Gold Corp., and its contractors contributed directly or indirectly to the failure.
The Yukon government has not yet agreed to a public inquiry. Mines Minister John Streicker has said the government is reviewing the IRB report and will determine next steps, but there is no timeline.
Bill Slater, an independent environmental consultant who has advised the First Nation since the mine’s planning stages, said the review board did a solid job explaining the physical reasons for the collapse and confirming the company’s failures in construction and operation.
The board identified five major technical reasons for the collapse: too much weak ore in a key part of the heap, a drainage system that didn’t work, slopes that were steeper than planned, loose and saturated ore that could suddenly liquefy and heavy irrigation that tipped the balance.
However, he said it didn’t examine why government officials didn’t act sooner.
“They did not really have an opportunity or time to delve into the issues of what were the reasons that this was allowed to happen. How did we get to the point where all of those five main contributing factors occurred? How come none of those were stopped? How come nobody noticed that each of those things was happening, or any one of them was happening? Where were the regulators in stopping that from happening?” Slater said.
He pointed to missed warning signs, like seepage from the heap leach facility, and the absence of the Yukon government at a key water board hearing in 2019, missing a chance to review the design and provide oversight.
The financial impact is another serious concern. Hope said the Eagle Gold collapse has cost each Yukon household the equivalent of just under $13,000 in government costs, based on government figures.
She pointed out that most major mines in Yukon have ended up abandoned or in trouble, with the public shouldering the burden for cleanup.
“Eight out of the nine mines that have been approved in the Yukon have resulted in abandoned mine failures. When the Yukon government fails to act within their responsibility as a regulator, they put all Yukoners at risk, and we end up continuing to pick up the tabs in the end,” she said.
Nadja Kunz, Canada Research Chair in Mine Water Management and Stewardship and associate professor at the University of British Columbia, reviewed the report and said that she has heard concerns about how quickly new mining projects are being approved in Yukon and whether Indigenous communities are being properly consulted. Smaller governments like Yukon’s, she said, may not have enough staff or expertise to keep up with complex mining projects.
“There’s anxiety about whether communities are truly being heard,” she said.
She said this incident is a warning for the entire Canadian mining sector.
“There’s never been a more important time to make sure we’re doing this right. This is an absolute warning sign about how we need to do better for the broader industry, and not just here in this case in Yukon.”